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Using panel data, we provide an integrated treatment of factor endowments, factor prices, and 
international specialization. In the various cross sections, we confirm the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction 
that, with sufficient differences in country endowments, there is no factor 
Price equalization and countries specialize in different subsets of goods. We also explain why, despite 
higher returns to capital, poor countries do not attract more capital from rich countries. Moreover, along 
their development path, countries experience the structural change predicted by theory. We find that 
these changes in specialization mainly occur within industries. Despite capital accumulation by most 
countries, we find no decrease in the return to capital at any given capital-labour ratio. This must have 
facilitated growth through capital accumulation.. 
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Abstract
Using panel data, we provide an integrated treatment of factor endowments, factor prices,
and international specialization. In the various cross sections, we con¯rm the Heckscher-
Ohlin prediction that, with su±cient di®erences in country endowments, there is no factor
price equalization and countries specialize in di®erent subsets of goods. We also explain
why, despite higher returns to capital, poor countries do not attract more capital from rich
countries. Moreover, along their development path, countries experience the structural
change predicted by theory. We ¯nd that these changes in specialization mainly occur
within industries. Despite capital accumulation by most countries, we ¯nd no decrease in
the return to capital at any given capital-labor ratio. This must have facilitated growth
through capital accumulation.
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The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model predicts that international specialization and trade are driven
by di®erences in factor endowments. It is one of the most in°uential models in international
economics because it has far-reaching implications for the level and distribution of income. For
instance, the model predicts that, in rich countries, a growing trade with developing nations
will increase the total income, along with a redistribution of income towards skilled workers
and the owners of capital. In addition, as shown by Ventura (1997), trade facilitates growth in
certain circumstances. Indeed, small countries that grow through capital accumulation should
alter their specialization toward capital-intensive goods. This increases the demand for capital
and thus sustains the return to capital and the incentives to accumulate even more capital.
The combination of international trade and structural change can therefore bring about growth
without decreasing returns. Another prediction of the HO model is that, if country endowments
in e®ective factors are very di®erent, there will be no factor price equalization (FPE), with a
higher rental cost of capital in poor countries. This should lead to °ows of capital to the less
developed countries and to higher wages in these countries.
To study the essential mechanisms that involve international specialization, factor returns
and capital accumulation, we proceed in two steps. We ¯rst show that the factor proportions
model without FPE indeed provides a good description of what is really happening. Using
panel data on 44 developing and developed countries over the period 1976-2000, we ¯nd that
the HO model actually explains specialization at an aggregate level in each cross section of
countries, as well as the changes in specialization that occur along the development path of
each country.
In a second step, we study the implications of our model for factor returns and thus growth.
In fact, while most previous works in the empirical literature on the HO model focus on the
relationship between factor endowments and specialization, our empirical approach generates
1direct estimates of workers' compensation and returns to capital (or the value of the marginal
product of capital, MPK) in each country.1 With these estimates, we can check the internal
consistency of our approach. We ¯nd that there is indeed no FPE, with higher implied wages
in rich countries and higher implied returns to capital in the less developed countries. In ad-
dition, we provide an explanation of why, despite a higher return to capital in poor countries,
capital does not °ow systematically from rich to poor countries. Finally, our results indicate
two factors that must have enhanced growth by most countries. Decomposing the changes over
time in the countries' capital-labor ratios in within-industry changes and between-industry
changes, we ¯nd that, for many countries, including the East Asian growth miracles, the struc-
tural transformation emphasized by Ventura (1997) mainly occurred within industries. This
must have facilitated growth as it should be easier for ¯rms to alter their industrial specializa-
tion from, say, rudimentary machinery to higher quality machinery (a change of specialization
within an industry) than to switch from coarse textiles to high quality machinery (a change of
specialization across industries). The second growth-enhancing factor is that, despite capital
accumulation by most countries worldwide, the returns to capital have remained stable at ¯xed
capital-labor ratios, thus sustaining the incentives to accumulate capital.
In this paper, the estimation of the HO model is based on the graphical approach by
Deardor® (1974).2 Deardor®'s (1974) approach is particularly convenient for our purpose.
First, it allows countries to specialize in a subset of goods. In the HO model, this is a necessary
result when factor endowments are very di®erent across countries: with highly heterogeneous
endowments, there is no FPE and therefore countries must specialize in the subset of goods most
suited to their endowments. While most previous studies in trade assumed that factor prices are
equalized, recent research provides evidence that there is no FPE and that OECD and poorer
countries belong to di®erent cones of specialization (Debaere and Demiroglu, 2003; Schott,
1In this paper, we use interchangeably \return to capital" and \value of the MPK".
2Kohli (1978) introduced an alternative methodology followed recently by Harrigan (1997) and Redding
(2002). Given our focus on factor returns, the approach µ a la Deardor® (1974) is more appropriate.
22003).3 Accordingly, we choose cone frontiers so that OECD countries and most developing
countries belong to two di®erent cones. Naturally, most countries move within their cone and
some of them, like the Asian Dragons, join the capital-rich cone at some point in the period 1976-
2000. To conform to the model, for each country-period, we follow Schott (2003) who also relies
on Deardor® (1974) (but to study cross-sectional data), and recast industry data in two more
theoretically-appropriate \Heckscher-Ohlin aggregates", i.e. sets of goods with similar factor
intensities. Consider, for instance, the various national transport industries in 1990. Germany
specializes in luxury cars and aircrafts produced with capital-intensive techniques. Hence, the
German transport industry in 1990 belongs to the capital-intensive HO aggregate. On the
contrary, Malaysia is rather specialized in the production of bicycles produced with more labor-
intensive techniques, and the Malaysian transport industry is classi¯ed in the labor-intensive
HO aggregate. We thus explicitly recognize the important within-industry heterogeneity in
terms of factor intensities.4
The second convenient property of Deardor®'s (1974) approach is that, as we shall show,
it can be readily augmented with (Hicks-neutral) total factor productivity (TFP) di®erences µ a
la Tre°er (1995). Accounting for these TFP di®erences is important: TFP di®erences do exist
and, as found by Fitzgerald and Hallak (2004), their omission could introduce important biases
in the empirical estimation of the HO model. For example, consider the realistic case in which
there is a positive correlation between a country's TFP and its capital-labor ratio. In such a
case, if TFP di®erences are not properly accounted for, the returns to capital in poor countries
is overestimated. As our work precisely focuses on factor returns, it is all the more crucial to
estimate and correct for the TFP di®erences.
3The well-known work by Tre°er (1993) is original in that it speci¯cally confronts the fact that factor prices
are clearly not equalized and, as the present work, it provides estimates of factor returns. But Tre°er (1993) still
assumes that countries belong to the same cone: in his article, di®erences are not driven by factor proportions,
but only by productivity di®erences. For instance, the cost of an \e®ective" unit of labor is assumed to be the
same in the US and in Bangladesh.
4With product-level U.S. import data, Schott (2004) ¯nds that factor heterogeneity also exists at the product
level, with capital and skill abundant countries specializing in high value products.
3Moreover, we correct for factor quality in a simple way. In order to get comparable quantities
of capital across countries, we estimate quality-equivalent stocks of capital using the results of
Eaton and Kortum (2001). They rely on data on the international trade of equipment goods
to infer the price of quality-equivalent capital in the various countries, and, remarkably, ¯nd
that the cost of equipment goods is systematically higher in the less developed countries. To
account for di®erent educational levels of the population, we employ the more standard Barro
and Lee (2001) quality adjustment of the labor force.
As stated earlier, we ¯nd that, despite capital accumulation by most countries, the returns
to capital at ¯xed capital-labor ratios have remained stable over time. We come to this result
as follows. As will be clear later, the estimation of the HO model following Deardor® (1974) is
greatly facilitated when the frontiers between the cones are ¯xed over time. We here make the
null hypothesis that the cone cuto®s are constant over time and check that the conditions for
this stability are satis¯ed. Actually these frontiers should remain ¯xed whenever the relative
\pro¯tability" of the two HO aggregates is constant over time. For that, it must be that
the joint impact of price changes and technology changes is the same for both aggregates.5
Testing for this hypothesis, we ¯nd that, for both aggregates, this joint impact of price and
technology changes is not economically or statistically signi¯cant over the period 1976-2000. For
the capital-intensive goods for instance, even though the growth of most countries (including
the East Asian countries) has drastically increased the world supply of these goods, it has not
become less pro¯table to produce these goods. Our results thus show that, to understand the
structural change of a country, we can simply use the thought experiment of a small country
accumulating capital in an otherwise stable world. But the results also imply the claimed result
that factor returns for a given capital-labor ratio have remained ¯xed over time. Combining
this result with the one of a constant MPK in the diversi¯cation cone (proved theoretically
5For instance, in the celebrated Lerner (1952) diagram, specialization and the frontiers of the cone of diver-
si¯cation are determined by the location of the two unit-value isoquants with equations fa(L;K) = 1=pa, with
a = l for the labor-intensive good and a = k for the capital-intensive good.
4by Ventura (1997) for the case with two goods), we obtain that the value of the MPK, or the
return to capital, has not decreased over time for the countries in this cone.6 This means that
the \miracle" economies in East Asia could enjoy economic growth without decreasing returns
while moving across the cone of diversi¯cation.
As in the standard HO model with multiple cones, and despite TFP di®erences across
countries, we ¯nd that the returns to capital tend to be higher in poor countries. So why is it the
case that we observe no systematic °ow of capital from rich to poor countries? Our explanation
is the following: once we take into account the fact that the cost of capital adjusted for quality
di®erences is much higher in these countries (Eaton and Kortum, 2001), the advantage due to
the rate-of-return di®erential vanishes. Indeed, the ¯nancial rate of return to capital investment
is not higher in poor countries. For an investor, not much is to be gained from a systematic
reallocation of capital from rich to poor countries. We therefore con¯rm the empirical ¯nding
of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) although we follow a totally di®erent approach: the value of the
MPK is higher in poor countries; the ¯nancial rates of return of investing in manufacturing are
much more similar across countries; and the reason for this is the higher relative price of capital
goods in poor countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 estimates the production side
of the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. Section 3 focuses on the returns to capital implied
by our model and exposes the implications of our results in terms of growth. The last section
concludes.
6Debaere and Demiroglu (2006) also conduct an empirical work on the same topic, but they do not verify
one of the elements at the heart of the mechanism, namely the stability over time of the value of the MPK for
the \miracle" economies.
52 The production side of the Heckscher-Ohlin model
Our theoretical framework is the traditional 2 £ 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model. We shall explain in
this section how we make it empirically operational. We will also give arguments for selecting
this particular model.
2.1 Deardor®'s (1974) graphical approach to specialization
Consider N countries, n = 1;:::;N. At date t, country n is endowed with a quantity Kt
n of
capital and a quantity Lt
n of labor. There are two goods that can be produced in each country:
good l is labor-intensive, and good k is capital-intensive. There is no factor intensity reversal.
Factors are mobile between sectors, but immobile internationally. Both goods are produced
with constant returns to scale (CRS) by competitive ¯rms, and the marginal product of each
factor is positive and decreasing at the ¯rm (and industry) level. For the moment, we assume
that all countries have access to the same technology. Each country is small and can freely
trade goods on the world market at date-t prices.
In a competitive equilibrium, when factor endowments are su±ciently di®erent, countries
cannot lie in the FPE set. As factor prices are not equalized, countries have to specialize
according to their endowments: they are located in di®erent cones of specialization. The
countries with a low capital-labor ratio (Kt
n=Lt
n 2 [¿0 = 0;¿t
1]) specialize in the production of the









specialize in the production of the capital-intensive good. In this setting, ¿t
1 and ¿t
2 are the two
possibly time-varying boundaries of the cone of diversi¯cation.
More precisely, the countries with a low capital endowment produce only the labor-intensive



















6where n denotes a country (or \nation"), and t a date. Fl(:) denotes the production function
for the labor-intensive good, and fl(k) ´ Fl(k;1) is the production function in intensive form
and is concave. Note that in the previous equation but also in the following ones, Lt
n denotes
the total quantity of labor employed in the manufacturing sector of country n at date t.
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l < 0, ®t
k = 0, ¯t
k > 0, and a = k;l. The countries with a high capital endowment



















where Fk(:) denotes the production function for the capital-intensive good, and fk(:) is concave.
Following Deardor® (1974, 2000), Figure 1 represents the theoretically implied patterns of
specialization. The dashed line represents the value added of the labor-intensive good divided
by the total number of workers in manufacturing over a country's \development path". Sim-
ilarly, the solid line represents value added per worker for the capital-intensive good. The
Rybczynski e®ect says that, with ¯xed prices and technologies, capital accumulation in the
cone of diversi¯cation leads to a reduced production of the labor-intensive good and to an in-
creased production of the capital-intensive good. The thin straight line that is tangent to the
two curves determines the capital-labor ratios in the two industries (equal to ¿t
1 and ¿t
2). Figure
2 shows total value added per worker for the various levels of capital per worker. One can also
prove that the slope of the value added per capita curve (in Figure 2) is equal to the rental
cost of capital, and that the intercept of the tangent to this curve with the vertical axis is the
compensation per worker.
It is also well-known that a change in the relative price of the two goods or a biased tech-
nological progress should modify the structure of industrial production. For instance, if the
7Production path of the labor−intensive good















Figure 2: Value-added per worker and factor returns in the 2 £ 2 HO model.
8relative price of the capital-intensive good goes up or if technological progress is biased in its
direction, then the two cone cuto®s should move to the left, with more countries producing
the capital-intensive goods and each country in the cone of diversi¯cation producing relatively
more of the capital-intensive goods.
A useful property of the model is that we can estimate it with no particular assumption
about demand. For instance, we do not have to make the \consumption similarity" assumption
that is used more or less explicitly in the works on the factor content of trade.7 Demand factors
are still important, but only through their e®ects on prices.
2.2 Empirical approach
We focus on the manufacturing sector as it should contain fewer non-tradables than other sec-
tors of the economy, such as the agricultural sector or the services. On the one hand, it makes
more reasonable the assumption that, whatever their location, all ¯rms producing similar goods
can sell these goods at the same price. On the other hand, including the agricultural and service
sectors might provide a stricter test of the model at stake.
A continuum of goods We now give some empirical content to the textbook model with two
goods. In reality, much more than two goods are produced. Suppose that there are actually
three cones (one of diversi¯cation, two of specialization), with rental costs of capital varying
across cones but constant within a single cone.8 Theory implies that a country in a given cone
should produce goods such that the unit-value isoquant is tangent to the cone's isocost line.
Figure 3 shows this with a diagram similar to the one in Lerner (1952). This situation provides
strong predictions that are contradicted by the data. For instance, they imply that a country
7See Tre°er and Zhu (2005) for a discussion of the \consumption similarity" condition.
8In this section, to make the exposition simpler, we make the assumption that the return to capital is
constant within each cone. Later in the paper, we shall assume that the return to capital is decreasing within





with Ki=Li > ¿2
with Ki=Li < ¿1




Figure 3: Lerner diagram with three cones of specialization.
with a capital-labor ratio Kn=Ln just above ¿i will only produce goods with a capital-labor
ratio at K=L = ¿i or just above.
We rather rely on a speci¯cation that yields desirable theoretical properties and seems
empirically appropriate, as shown later. In the spirit of Dornbusch et al. (1980), we assume
that each country produces a continuum of goods with various capital-labor intensities. Country
n is populated by a continuum of workers with a total mass Ln. This country is also endowed
with Kn units of capital. Omitting the time superscript, let ¿1 and ¿2 be the two cone cuto®s.
Each worker is indexed by i, with i uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]. We suppose that
















. This also implies that
country n's capital-labor ratio is Kn=Ln as required. With this modelling, a country produces
goods that it should not produce in the \pure" model with free trade (like in Dornbusch et al.,
1980). But one may generate this kind of production by including small transportation costs












with Ki=Li < q or Ki=Li > q
with Ki=Li < q
Figure 4: Modi¯ed Lerner diagram with three cones and two HO aggregates.
the same kind of results.




















. There is therefore a cuto® q(¿1;¿2) =
2¿1¿2
¿1+¿2 such that countries
in the labor-rich cone produce only goods with a capital-labor ratio below q, and countries in
the capital-rich cone produce only goods with a capital-labor ratio above q. This cuto® q is
shown in Figure 4.
The Heckscher-Ohlin aggregates Given the above speci¯cation and the good cuto®, we
can follow Schott (2003) and de¯ne \Heckscher-Ohlin aggregates". The labor-intensive HO
aggregate is the set of goods such that K
L(i) · q, while the capital-intensive aggregate is the
set of goods such that K
L(i) > q. As we do not have data on speci¯c goods but only on ISIC





























We thus gather industries according to their capital-intensity rather than according to their end
use (as most classi¯cations such as the International Standard Industrial Classi¯cation (ISIC)
do). For instance, in Schott's (2003) preferred model, the footwear industry in Panama is
classi¯ed as belonging to a labor-intensive aggregate, while the Italian footwear industry belongs
to an aggregate with a higher capital intensity. For any ISIC industry, cross-country di®erences
in factor intensity might re°ect, beyond factor substitution, the fact that countries specialize
in goods that di®er in quality. It might also be the result of an international fragmentation
of the production process, with the labor-rich countries specializing in the production stages
that are labor-demanding. The aggregation has important consequences. First, goods are
de¯ned according to their capital intensity as in the production side of the HO model. Second,
we reduce the number of \goods". Finally, aggregation might solve part of the well-known
indeterminacy problem that arises in the HO models with more goods than factors (Melvin,
1968).9
While Tre°er (1993) assumed that all countries lie in a unique cone, we take the results
by Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Schott (2003) as evidence that countries lie in di®erent
9Bernstein and Weinstein (2002) ¯nd substantial evidence of production indeterminacy using data from
Japanese prefectures and OECD countries. The evidence is stronger at the regional level. Bernstein and
Weinstein suggest that this discrepancy might be explained by the high trade costs incurred in international
transactions. If this argument is correct, the reduction in transportation costs associated with globalization
should make production patterns more indeterminate over time. With a wider cross-section of countries, Schott
(2003) reports results that indicate a major indeterminacy of production at the industry level. Bernstein and
Weinstein (2002) argue that \aggregation can resolve production indeterminacy arising from the existence of
more goods than factors only in exceptional cases" (p. 60). While this statement is true in a literal sense,
aggregation can signi¯cantly reduce production indeterminacy. Whether aggregation solves a large fraction of
the indeterminacy problem or not is to be determined empirically.
12cones. Speci¯cally, we assume that countries belong to one of three cones. Also by assumption,
the marginal product of capital is constant within each of the ¯rst two cones, but decreasing in
the third one. We denote by wc and rc the wage and the rental cost of capital in cone c = 1;2.
In the third cone, both the wage and the rental cost of capital depend on Kn=Ln. They are
denoted w3(Kn=Ln) and r3(Kn=Ln). The marginal product of capital (MPK) in the third cone
is decreasing, just as in the textbook 2 £ 2 model.10 Our speci¯cation also implies the sensible
result that, when moving from the second cone to the third one, there is no jump in the MPK.
In country n with a capital-labor ratio Kn=Ln, the value added for the labor-intensive
aggregate is, once divided by the total number of workers in manufacturing, given by:
V Aln(¿1;¿2)
Ln




















= 0 if Kn
Ln > ¿2,
and, for the capital-intensive aggregate, it is:
V Akn(¿1;¿2)
Ln
























To ensure the continuity of the value-added functions at ¿1, we impose w1+r1¿1 = w2+r2¿1.
For simplicity, we assume w1 = 0. If production in the third cone production is given by
Fn(Kn;Ln) = AK1¡¯
n L¯
n, i.e. a simple Cobb-Douglas production function augmented by a
TFP factor, A, the marginal product of labor in country n is ¯A(Kn=Ln)1¡¯ and the marginal
product of capital is (1 ¡ ¯)A(Kn=Ln)¡¯. Using the fact that a country with Kn=Ln = ¿2 is
10This is consistent with Davis and Weinstein (2001) who ¯nd systematic di®erences across OECD countries
in industry factor usage in nontraded sectors.
13both in the second cone and in the third cone, we can rewrite the marginal product of labor





and the marginal product of





. Figure 5 shows the specialization
patterns implied by our assumptions.
By considering the possibility that countries lie in di®erent cones, Schott (2003) introduced
non-linearities in the value added per worker, with the non-linearities occuring at the cone
frontiers. Here we even have non-linearities within each cone. This does not contradict theory.
While simpler, the linear form might be considered, as Fitzgerald and Hallak (2004) put it,
a \knife-edge" result derived under very strong assumptions. But once we depart from the
textbook case with a number of produced goods equal to the number of factors, there is no
reason for linearity to hold at the good or HO-aggregate level.
Notice that this speci¯cation introduces restrictions across HO aggregates. Thus, on the one
hand, our speci¯cation is less restrictive than Schott's (2003) as we allow for TFP di®erences
across countries, but, on the other hand, we impose restrictions across aggregates that do not
appear in his paper.11
International di®erences in total factor productivity With Hicks-neutral total factor
productivity di®erences across countries, wages and rental rates of capital di®er across countries.
Figure 6 shows the e®ect of such productivity di®erences: for a relatively productive country
n, the production levels of the two aggregates are multiplied by the same factor. This is a pure
scale e®ect. We denote wcn and rcn the wage and rental cost of capital in country n when it is
located in cone c = 1;2. We make the assumption that we also have r2n = ®r1n, with ® < 1, for
all n: moving from the ¯rst cone to the second one leads to the same (proportional) reduction
11Such restrictions do exist in the model with two factors of production, but they are not necessarily valid
in more general models. For instance, this will be the case if endowments in natural resources and land favor





Figure 5: Production patterns and value-added per worker with our simplifying assumptions.
Production path of the labor−intensive good
Production path of the capital−intensive good
K=L ¿1 ¿2
V Al=L;V Ak=L
Figure 6: Production patterns in the 2 £ 2 HO model and the scale e®ect.
15in the marginal product of capital for all countries. Using the above continuity constraints, we
get w2n = (1 ¡ ®)¿1r1n.












Ln · ¿1; (4)















= 0 if Kn
Ln > ¿2; (6)
and
fk (Kn=Ln;¿1;¿2;®;¯) = 0 if Kn
Ln · ¿1; (7)



























Ln > ¿2; (9)
which must hold for each n.
International di®erences in factor quality We take into account factor quality di®erences
across countries. Let zt
fn be the quality of factor f = K;L; in country n at date t. If Kt
n is the
measured quantity of capital and Lt
n is the measured quantity of labor, then the quantities of






n. The way we obtain
estimates of these quality factors is detailed in the data section that follows. As we try to be
as close as possible to the traditional 2 £ 2 model, the relevant quantities of labor and capital
16are the ones used in the manufacturing sector: in the cone of diversi¯cation, the production of
each aggregate is dictated by the factor proportion in each sector and the quantity of factors
employed in manufacturing.12
Changes in technologies or relative prices As we do not focus on a cross section but
instead consider panel data, we must consider the impact of technological progress and of
price changes over time. In order to measure these changes, we introduce multiplicative time
dummies, denoted ±t
k and ±t
l, speci¯c to each aggregate but common to all countries. This
modelling assumption is simple and in the spirit of the HO model. It is correct if the law of
one price holds at the producer level for manufacturing goods produced with similar factor
intensities, and if, for each HO aggregate, all countries face the same rate of technological
progress. Changes over time of ±t
a lead to a scale e®ect that shifts in the same proportion all
the production levels of the a aggregate in any cross section of countries.13 The other scale
e®ect is due to the TFP di®erences (that appear here through the r1n's): it is country-speci¯c





































k = 0 for the ¯rst period in the panel and the fa(:) functions given in Equations 4-9.14
12This is also the approach followed by Schott (2001).
13This means that all countries specialized in the production of a given aggregate should face similar rates of
technological progress. On the other hand, countries with di®erent specializations might have measured TFP
growth rates that di®er.
14The dummies ±t
l and ±t
k indeed measure both technological changes and relative price changes. As explained
in section 2.3, we employ data on value added in current national currency. Denoting Fan(¢) the production
function for aggregate a in country n in 1996, °t
a the rate of Hicks-neutral technological progress for aggregate
a between 1996 and date t (assumed to be the same for all countries), D1996;t
an the price de°ator for aggregate
a in country n, and e1996
n;$ the 1996 exchange rate, the observed value added in current national currency is
D1996;t
an (1 + °t
a)Fan(¢)e1996
n;$ . We de°ate value added data by the national consumption de°ator D1996;t
nc and
convert it into 1996 U.S. dollars using the 1996 exchange rate. We thus obtain for aggregate a in country n
17Here, r1n is the rental cost of capital of country n in the ¯rst, labor-rich cone during the ¯rst
period. But, if country n is in fact in the cone of diversi¯cation during the ¯rst period, r1n is
the hypothetical rental cost of capital country n would have in the ¯rst cone, and r2n = ®r1n
is its actual rental rate.
If our restrictions across aggregates are correct and if technological progress and value






If we can con¯rm this result empirically, it would validate our null hypothesis that the cone






a = 0;8t 6= t
0;a = k;l:
This other result would indicate that the combined e®ect of price and technology changes have





a, as well as E[²t
na²t0
n0a0jX] = 0;if n 6= n0 and/or t 6= t0 and/or a 6= a0: The
coe±cients ±t
k;±t
l;®;¯, and r1n are estimated with Non Linear Least Squares. Note that we
do not assume that the error term is multiplicative and that we do not take logs in Equations
10-11.
We rely on previous works to choose the cone cuto®s ¿1 and ¿2, as well as the implied cone
cuto®, q(¿1;¿2). With a methodology that we build on, Schott (2003) presents evidence that
countries in 1990 were lying in two cones of diversi¯cation, i.e. two cones without diminishing
returns within each cone. He chooses a cone cuto® such that the OECD countries lie in the
capital-rich cone and most of the less developed countries lie in a labor-rich cone. Debaere and








cn Fan(¢). Here we denote r1nfa(¢) the 1996 production function in
intensive form for country n. In Equations 10-11, (1+±t









it measures 1) the technological change for the HO aggregate a and 2) the change in the relative price of the
goods in the a aggregate (relatively to the consumption goods).
18Demiroglu (2003) use the \lens condition" of Deardor® (1994) to show that, in 1990, the OECD
countries had endowments su±ciently similar lie in the same cone, but the poorer countries were
too rich in labor to be in this cone. Building on these works, we choose two cuto®s (¿1 = 1;500
and ¿2 = 15;000) such that the OECD countries were all located in the same cone around 1990
(K¤
n=L¤
n 2]¿2;+1[), and most developing countries lie in another cone (with K¤
n=L¤
n 2]¿1;¿2]).
Consistent with Xu (2003), the poorest countries (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in this paper) are
located in a third cone (with K¤
n=L¤
n 2 [0;¿1]).15
2.3 Data and construction of the main variables
We use data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO, 2005a,b)
and the Penn World Table version 6.1 (PWT) (Heston et al., 2002). The UNIDO data set at the
3-digit level presents data for 28 sectors, but several countries aggregate data for two or more
sectors (like \food products" and \beverages") into a larger one. To appropriately recognize
missing data, we follow Koren and Tenreyro (2007) and aggregate sectors so as to obtain a
consistent classi¯cation across countries. This leaves us with the 19 sectors or industries listed
in Table 1. To estimate the model, we use 5-year averages for the periods 1976-1980, 1981-1985,
1986-1990, 1991-1995, and 1996-2000. We use the data for a country in a given period when
they are available and when the country is reasonably open to international trade (as docu-
mented in Sachs and Warner, 1995). The time period is su±ciently long to make reasonable
the assumption of capital mobility within and across sectors at the national level.
15Our model is close to the one selected by Schott (2003) for the cross section he studies (year 1990). He
ignores the ¯rst cone, the one specialized in the labor-intensive aggregate, but we assume that there are only
two countries in that cone anyway. He assumes that the OECD cone is a cone of diversi¯cation, the countries
producing both capital-intensive goods and goods with an average capital intensity. We instead group all
these goods in a single aggregate. Thanks to this grouping, we do not have to make, like Schott (2003), the
assumption the value added for the middle aggregate is just zero for the country with the highest capital-labor
ratio. Contrary to Schott (2003), we do not test the null hypothesis of a single cone against the alternative of
a world with multiple cones. In terms of model selection, our strategy is rather to use the existing results, and,
like Harrigan (1997), to follow the injunction by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) \estimate, don't test."
191 Food products; beverages; tobacco
2 Textiles
3 Wearing apparel, except footwear
4 Leather products
5 Footwear, except rubber and plastic
6 Wood products, except furniture
7 Furniture, except metal
8 Paper and paper products
9 Printing and publishing
10 Industrial chemicals; petroleum re¯neries; petroleum and coal products
11 Rubber products
12 Plastic products
13 Pottery, china, earthenware; glass; other non-metallic mineral products
14 Iron and steel; non-ferrous metals
15 Fabricated metal products; machinery, except electrical
16 Machinery, electric
17 Transport equipment
18 Professional and scienti¯c equipment
19 Other manufactured products
Table 1: List of sectors.
Labor To measure the quantity of labor in a given industry and at the manufacturing level,
we use data from the UNIDO database. These data are corrected for the heterogeneity of
human capital with the method proposed by Hall and Jones (1999) and used, for instance, by
Debaere and Demiroglu (2003, 2006).16 Data on educational achievement are from Barro and
Lee (2000). Table 2 contains the relevant data.
Capital To compute the stocks of capital at the industry level, we use investment data from the
UNIDO at the 3-digit (UNIDO, 2005a) and 4-digit (UNIDO, 2005b) levels.17 We take invest-












is the fraction of the population over 25 with e years of education.
17Investment corresponds to the purchases and own-account construction of ¯xed assets, including land,
buildings, other construction and land improvements, transport equipment, a well as machinery and other
equipment. The stocks of capital we measure therefore include part (land) of what Caselli and Feyrer (2007)
call the non-reproducible capital. Other natural resources are omitted, but the impact of this omission is
mitigated by the fact that we focus on the manufacturing sector. The ¯rst database provides data for the
period 1963-2001, and the second database covers the period 1985-2001. The second database contains data
20ment in current U.S. dollars, and use exchange rates from the PWT to translate these numbers
in the current national currency. We compute the implicit national investment de°ators as the
ratio value of national investment in current national currency units (ICUR) / value of national
investment in 1996 national constant prices (IKON). With the de°ated investments, we then
use the perpetual inventory method to compute stocks of capital at the sectoral level. We
choose a depreciation rate of 6%.18 The exact formula is the one employed by Leamer (1984, p.
233, third proposed method). We compute initial capital stocks assuming a constant geometric
growth rate for investment. This way we obtain national stocks of capital in the 1996 national
currency units.
In this paper as in all works with international cross sections involving quantities of factors,
one of the main di±culties is to build data that are comparable across countries. This is
especially true for the stocks of capital (Leamer, 1984). Using only the 1996 exchange rates
relative to the U.S. dollar to obtain stocks of capital in 1996 U.S. dollars might be misleading for
the one willing to have capital stocks comparable across countries. One approach, since Tre°er
(1993), is to correct for the heterogeneity in the productivity of capital. The work by Tre°er
(1993) is usually interpreted as indicating a strong correlation between the purchasing power
parity-adjusted price of investment goods (as measured by the PWT) and their productivity.
Following these results, Debaere and Demiroglu (2003, 2006) use the price of investment goods
given in the PWT as a measure of capital productivity. The idea is that a higher price indicates
a higher quality, poorly measured by the PWT. With this method, measured investment is
adjusted upward when investment is reported to be costly.
missing in the ¯rst one. We merge the two matrices. Even after merger, the database contains many holes.
In order to compute stocks of capital, we had to make assumptions about these missing values. When there
are holes within a sequence and when there are less than 6 consecutive years of missing data, we complete the
sequence using a linear interpolation. When the beginning (end) of a sequence is missing, we replace the last
(¯rst) three missing values with an average of the ¯rst (last) three available values. Finally, we keep capital
stock estimates only when we have at least 8 consecutive years of investment data (once holes are ¯lled).
18This is the discount rate chosen by Caselli (2004). When we choose higher discount rates (like 10 %),
the results remain qualitatively una®ected, but the ¯nancial rates of return to capital estimated later seem
unreasonably high.
21Instead, we think it is more natural to rely on Eaton and Kortum (2001) to derive estimates
of the relative prices of quality-equivalent capital in the various countries. They use 1985 data
on the international trade of equipment goods19 to infer their real prices in many developed
and developing countries. The ability to extract information on relative prices from trade data
is based on the following reasoning: 1) observing country n with big market shares around
the world indicates that n is a competitive supplier of capital goods, and 2) observing that
country n0 imports a lot relative to home purchases indicates that n0 does not face costly trade
barriers to imported capital goods. Eaton and Kortum (2001) ¯nd that trade barriers are
high for the less developed countries: given the fact that they do not export equipment goods,
imports of capital goods should represent a higher fraction of their investment. Among these
barriers to trade (also including geographical distance from the major exporters of equipment
goods), a low level of skills in poor countries appears to be especially important. This can be
interpreted as follows: in relatively backward economies, ¯rms with a low-skilled labor force
cannot use the high quality equipment goods produced in the most advanced economies (these
goods are not \appropriate"), and, as a result, these goods are not imported; international
di®erences in educational levels therefore result in international quality di®erences for capital
goods. The Eaton-Kortum (2001) estimates for the price of equipment goods for a given
country can be understood as the real price of a quality-equivalent unit of equipment good.
As prices are normalized so that the U.S. price is equal to one, we ¯nd for each country a
proxy for the quality-equivalent investment in capital goods (relative to the USA) by adjusting
investment by the reported prices for equipment goods.20 We therefore use the measured price
19Electrical machinery, nonelectrical machinery, and instruments.
20More precisely, Eaton and Kortum (2001) conduct a structural estimation of the national prices of (quality-
equivalent units of) equipment goods. Their empirical model is a Ricardian model with barriers to trade and
a continuum of heterogeneous goods. They estimate the costs parameters that are consistent with their model
and with observed bilateral trade data. Their theoretical approach and ours are notably di®erent. But we can
still have a situation in which 1) the producer (selling) prices of similar capital goods are almost the same in
all countries (as assumed here), and, 2) due to barriers to trade (transportation costs and di®erences in skills),
the e®ective prices of quality-equivalent units of capital goods do di®er across countries.
22of equipment capital to adjust reported investment downward when investment is costly.21 To
obtain a quality-equivalent stock of capital, we simply divide investment by the price of quality-
equivalent capital as estimated by Eaton and Kortum (2001).
Ideally, we should use price estimates for each year, rather than the Eaton-Kortum's (2001)
estimates for 1985. Nevertheless we think that this measure is appropriate for a vast majority
of countries as international di®erences in the real cost of capital should be persistent over time.
If international di®erences in the price of quality-equivalent capital are due to trade barriers
like physical distance and the lack of education, these di®erences should remain pretty stable
over time. Indeed, even though the geographical distribution of equipment goods production
has slightly changed over time, most countries far away from the main producers of equipment
goods have not seen this distance going down over time. And, similarly, the educational gap
between the USA and the other countries has not changed much since the beginning of the
period we study.22
With these data, we can check that labor in each country n is approximately distributed uni-
















we have chosen ¿1 = 1;500 and ¿2 = 15;000, labor in country n should be distributed uniformly




























Figure 7 plots the empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) of labor across industries.
We have normalized the industry capital-labor ratios by the same ratio at the country level




n . If our assumption is right, each cdf should be on the thick
line. Figure 7 indicates that our assumption comes close to what really happens in reality.23
21Eaton-Kortum (2001) document that there is a strong negative relationship between the price of equip-
ment goods and the real GDP per capita. When estimating the relationship, we ¯nd Pkn = 4:53(0:41) ¡
0:70(0:12) ln(y1985
n ), where y1985
n is country n's real GDP per capita relative to the US in 1985 (100 for the USA).
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The R2 is equal to 0.54. When a price estimate is missing in Eaton-
Kortum (2001), we get an estimate of the missing price by using this relationship. We then use zKn = 1=Pkn
for all countries.
22Countries like Korea and Norway are exceptions. For these countries we tend to underestimate real invest-
ment for the years after 1985. This is in part compensated by an overestimation for years before 1985.
23The shape of the cdf might indicate that capital intensities actually follow a gamma distribution. In this
231976- 1980 1981- 1985 1986- 1990 1991- 1995 1996- 2000
Country Abbr. \ zK;USA
zKn b zLn K¤
n=L¤
n b zLn K¤
n=L¤
n b zLn K¤
n=L¤
n b zLn K¤
n=L¤
n b zLn K¤
n=L¤
n
Australia AUS 1.63 2.23 14,273 2.24 15,553 2.25 16,543 2.28 19,369 na na
Austria AUT 1.36 2.08 36,396 2.15 38,781 2.14 43,242 2.16 50,471 2.20 51,296
Bangladesh BGD 3.32 na na na na na na na na 1.35 398
Bolivia BOL 2.88 1.48 6,522 na na 1.56 10,111 1.62 7,577 1.66 7,041
Bulgaria BGR 2.18 na na na na na na na na 2.14 2,771
Canada CAN 1.24 2.31 14,443 2.35 18,029 2.34 20,779 2.44 26,851 na na
Chile CHL 2.42 1.71 8,555 1.75 10,188 1.84 6,834 1.93 7,705 1.97 11,799
Colombia COL 2.51 na na na na 1.58 5,870 1.62 5,517 na na
Cyprus CYP 1.96 1.81 25,902 1.94 22,545 2.06 17,648 2.10 16,471 2.13 15,083
Denmark DNK 1.15 2.17 42,815 2.21 40,197 2.29 35,523 2.30 30,953 na na
Ecuador ECU 2.52 1.60 8,831 na na na na 1.79 13,905 1.83 16,030
Egypt EGY 4.46 na na na na na na na na 1.62 4,698
El Salvador SLV 2.68 na na na na na na 1.47 7,752 1.52 3,821
Finland FIN 1.61 2.00 23,442 2.03 24,760 2.14 29,572 2.26 37,314 2.31 35,758
France FRA 1.13 na na na na na na na na 2.10 86,083
Greece GRC 2.55 1.77 18,206 1.86 20,182 1.94 19,703 2.01 21,059 2.08 22,460
Guatemala GTM 2.65 na na na na na na 1.34 6,511 na na
Hong-Kong HKG 1.60 1.73 10,837 1.83 9,939 1.93 11,362 2.05 19,140 2.12 33,734
Hungary HUN 2.03 na na na na na na 1.93 12,391 1.95 12,467
Indonesia IDN 2.91 1.33 1,811 1.4 1,865 1.41 1,822 1.46 2,290 1.55 5,834
Ireland IRL 1.84 1.90 13,856 1.97 17,971 2.04 20,757 2.11 22,265 2.15 23,878
Israel ISR 1.82 na na na na 2.11 17,674 2.12 18,575 2.15 23,311
Italy ITA 1.11 1.70 50,636 1.73 54,745 1.79 58,393 1.85 56,404 1.90 53,015
Japan JPN 0.99 1.99 46,072 2.07 47,305 2.15 51,086 2.22 59,982 2.25 72,247
Korea, Rep KOR 1.47 1.81 10,860 1.97 14,486 2.14 16,789 2.28 30,764 2.37 51,167
Malaysia MYS 2.33 1.49 3,126 1.55 4,006 1.62 5,341 1.81 6,657 1.94 11,205
Mexico MEX 2.08 na na na na 1.66 7,225 1.77 9,206 1.83 11,203
Netherlands NLD 1.54 1.99 41,752 2.04 46,835 2.08 52,319 2.13 58,426 2.18 59,792
New Zealand NZL 2.14 na na na na 2.32 19,428 na na na na
Norway NOR 1.78 2.02 24,651 2.07 28,669 2.28 30,692 2.43 32,757 2.45 29,726
Panama PAN 2.33 na na na na na na na na 2.02 8,297
Peru PER 2.46 na na na na na na 1.88 4,566 1.98 5,686
Philippines PHL 2.45 na na na na na na 2.05 3,947 2.1 4,451
Poland POL 2.22 na na na na na na 2.09 5,620 2.12 4,986
Portugal PRT 1.95 1.48 17,132 1.53 17,302 1.61 15,059 1.68 12,355 1.73 13,610
Singapore SGP 1.73 1.46 13,372 1.49 19,381 1.61 22,670 1.82 24,583 1.96 35,708
Spain ESP 1.55 na na 1.72 27,543 1.80 28,232 1.88 26,695 1.96 26,036
Sri Lanka LKA 2.29 na na na na na na 1.71 1,357 1.75 1,466
Sweden SWE 1.09 2.10 38,229 2.15 42,543 2.16 46,070 na na na na
Trinidad and Tobaggo TTO 1.83 na na na na na na na na 1.82 28,500
Turkey TUR 2.78 na na na na na na 1.62 8,764 1.67 10,394
United Kingdom GBR 0.99 1.91 22,629 1.94 29,579 1.98 32,458 2.03 37,764 2.07 43,391
USA USA 1.00 2.48 16,509 2.58 20,809 2.61 23,782 2.65 27,769 2.67 31,986
Uruguay URY 2.26 na na na na na na 1.81 7,894 1.85 13,004
Venezuela VEN 2.15 1.55 23,269 1.67 22,461 na na na na 1.73 29,121
Notes: Capital and labor are measured in quality-equivalent units. Capital is in 1996 U.S. dollars. na = not available.
Table 2: Geographic coverage and some key variables.













Figure 7: Distribution of labor across industries.
We do ¯nd that more than 90% of labor is employed in industries within the required range.







Unsurprisingly, these are the steel and chemicals industries.
Correcting for the quality di®erences for the two factors has a signi¯cant impact on the
relative capital-labor ratios: Table 2 reveals that the correction factor for capital is the most
important. As a result, the relative capital-labor ratio for the typical less developed country
shrinks.
For the various periods we study, Table 3 presents the average capital-labor ratios at the
industry level in a rich country (the USA) and in a developing one (Malaysia). It appears that
the industries which are the most labor-intensive in the USA are also the most labor-intensive
in Malaysia (like Footwear or Furniture). But, with our classi¯cation in two HO aggregates
and an industry cuto® at q = 3;000, we ¯nd that, for the USA, just the wearing apparel in-
dustry in 1976-1980, is considered to be labor-intensive. On the contrary, for Malaysia in the
period 1976-1980, 8 industries (out of 19) belong to the labor-intensive HO aggregate. We also
paper, we keep the uniform distribution for its simplicity.
25obtain the possibly counterintuitive result that the U.S. textile industry was capital-intensive
in 1976-1980, while, during the same period, the transport equipment industry in Malaysia
was labor-intensive. This result is counterintuitive because, in OECD countries, the transport
equipment industry is more capital-intensive than the textile industry. Table 3 just indicates
that, due to within-industry specialization (and possibly factor substitution), the transport
equipment industry in Malaysia is more labor-intensive than the textile industry in the USA.
Value-added We compute value-added in 1996 U.S. dollars using the 1996 exchange rates and
national consumption de°ators implicitly given by the PWT. We prefer not to use PPP-adjusted
values: as in the HO model, we assume that all goods produced with the same capital-labor ratio
can be sold at the same price on international markets. We conjecture that, for tradables, the
observed deviations from absolute PPP at the retail level can be well explained by di®erences
in distribution costs across countries.24 Thus, we do not assume that the law of one price holds
at the retail level, but we assume that it holds at the producer level.
Ireland appears to be a very speci¯c country: its industry is characterized by an extremely
rapid growth in value-added per worker and a rather slow growth in capital per worker; growth
of the Irish industry cannot be explained by our HO model. As a result, we exclude Ireland from
our baseline regression and then discuss the results we obtain when this country is included.
2.4 Estimation of the model: results
Table 4 presents the results of our estimation for the cuto®s ¿1 = 1;500, ¿2 = 15;000, and
q = 3;000 (all numbers in 1996 U.S. dollars of quality-equivalent capital per e®ective worker).
The period dummies appear to be small (especially for the capital-intensive aggregate) and/or
not statistically signi¯cant (especially for the labor-intensive aggregate). This indicates that,
24Distribution services (local land and labor) are mostly nontradable, and can therefore di®er importantly
across countries. As these distribution costs account for 50% of the retail prices (Burstein et al., 2003), di®erences
in distribution prices can generate huge di®erences in retail prices.
26Sector 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
USA
Wearing apparel 2,486 3,074 3,732 4,212 6,077
Furniture 5,556 6,610 7,142 7,968 7,859
Footwear 3,387 4,501 6,569 8,184 10,198
Leather products 4,505 6,663 8,762 10,319 11,384
Other manufactured products 7,739 10,172 10,685 11,527 13,356
Metal products 9,064 10,820 12,318 13,374 15,772
Printing and publishing 10,131 11,715 13,617 16,033 17,283
Wood products 15,083 18,901 17,273 17,569 20,188
Textiles 11,677 14,140 15,936 17,755 23,125
Professional and scienti¯c equipment 10,816 14,111 14,008 19,684 23,935
Plastic products 13,699 16,252 17,021 19,768 23,348
Rubber products 20,177 24,953 25,778 26,889 29,581
Machinery 11,438 15,367 23,715 29,989 40,030
Food products 19,536 24,444 28,095 30,694 33,888
Transport equipment 14,864 22,078 25,464 32,455 38,785
Pottery and glass 24,084 30,521 30,931 32,878 35,971
Iron and steel 34,727 48,129 54,576 57,392 59,187
Paper products 33,066 42,994 53,878 64,536 72,448
Chemicals and petroleum 58,629 71,918 80,348 94,804 108,280
Malaysia
Wearing apparel 825 750 882 1,145 2,042
Footwear 2,925 3,653 2,918 1,558 3,404
Leather products 4,282 2,687 1,746 2,005 4,228
Other manufactured products 1,032 1,113 1,533 2,046 3,762
Furniture 1,347 1,551 2,772 2,109 2,901
Machinery 2,628 2,805 3,264 4,008 6,885
Rubber products 3,103 3,180 3,459 4,405 6,979
Professional and scienti¯c equipment 2,570 3,790 4,285 4,919 7,416
Plastic products 2,637 2,656 3,853 5,265 9,102
Wood products 3,290 3,666 5,184 5,359 7,489
Printing and publishing 10,754 6,126 5,369 5,454 6,544
Transport equipment 2,056 3,243 4,683 5,916 10,716
Food products 3,997 5,422 6,687 7,055 9,726
Metal products 3,072 3,300 5,116 7,482 12,714
Textiles 3,013 3,470 4,166 7,847 15,825
Pottery and glass 4,613 5,629 8,757 10,709 19,515
Iron and steel 3,192 5,518 17,446 13,340 16,603
Paper products 3,992 7,857 11,792 21,449 27,455
Chemicals and petroleum 7,046 12,384 19,507 34,281 55,319
Notes: Capital and labor are measured in e®ective units. Capital is in 1996 U.S. dollars. Sectors in increasing
order of capital-intensity for the period 1991-1995.
Table 3: Industry capital-labor ratios in the United States and Malaysia.
27over the 1976-2000 period, production patterns across countries are consistent with the model
with ¯xed (relative) prices and technologies. We interpret these ¯ndings as a validation of our
hypothesis that the cone cuto®s have not moved much between 1976 and 2000.
Our results also indicate a large drop in the value of the return to capital when moving from
the very labor-rich cone to the cone of diversi¯cation (with ^ ® = 0:14). This jump is implied by
our simplifying linearity assumption for the ¯rst cone and the decrease of the return to capital
would be smoother with a Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation in the ¯rst cone. But, even with this
other speci¯cation, we would measure a rapid decrease of the return to capital when countries
start accumulating capital. The labor elasticity of output is found to be of the right order of
magnitude (^ ¯ = 0:46). It may look small, but one should not forget that this elasticity is by
assumption common to all countries, including the low- or mid-income ones where the labor
share of income in manufacturing is lower than in rich countries.
For the 44 countries included in the regression, Figures 8-13 present the actual development
paths (with ¯lled squares and circles) and the ¯tted/predicted development paths (with solid
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: (13)
Figures 8-13 therefore show the changes in specialization due to the Rybczynski e®ect. They
also show the predicted changes in specialization if countries were to accumulate even more
capital, assuming a strong persistence in price and TFP levels. The ¯gures indicate that, over
the whole period, the share of the labor-intensive aggregate in global production has been small.
Many countries are specialized in the production of capital-intensive goods. But countries like
Bulgaria, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka produce signi¯cant quantities of the labor-
intensive aggregate and exhibit specialization patterns that are consistent with our empirical
28Variable Estimate s.e. Variable Estimate s.e.
±
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Country Estimate s.e. Country Estimate s.e.
Australia 6.11 (1.06) Japan 6.61 (1.17)
Austria 4.35 (0.77) Korea, Rep. 5.01 (0.86)
Bangladesh 4.89 (4.66) Malaysia 4.19 (0.57)
Bolivia 5.19 (0.70) Mexico 6.03 (0.86)
Bulgaria 0.87 (1.17) Netherlands 4.91 (0.87)
Canada 5.91 (1.03) New Zealand 3.95 (0.75)
Chile 8.98 (1.22) Norway 4.92 (0.86)
Colombia 8.06 (0.93) Panama 2.70 (0.65)
Cyprus 2.52 (0.46) Peru 8.14 (0.92)
Denmark 4.83 (0.85) Philippines 4.69 (0.72)
Ecuador 3.72 (0.65) Poland 2.50 (0.57)
Egypt 1.78 (0.81) Portugal 3.42 (0.60)
El Salvador 3.97 (0.65) Singapore 6.92 (1.19)
Finland 5.45 (0.95) Spain 6.11 (1.06)
France 3.66 (0.67) Sri Lanka 1.97 (1.04)
Greece 4.58 (0.80) Sweden 5.50 (0.98)
Guatemala 5.05 (0.85) Trinid. and Tob. 2.50 (0.50)
Hong-Kong 3.61 (0.61) Turkey 8.01 (1.15)
Hungary 1.66 (0.40) United Kingdom 4.69 (0.82)
Indonesia 2.53 (0.57) United States 7.58 (1.31)
Israel 4.79 (0.84) Uruguay 6.01 (0.94)
Italy 4.45 (0.79) Venezuela 3.91 (0.69)
Root MSE
Capital-intensive aggr. 402 Labor-intensive aggr. 1,648
Notes: The Table reports the estimates of System 10-11 with Non Linear Least Squares. These estimates
take the HO aggregate cuto® q = 3;000 to de¯ne the two HO aggregates, and the cone cuto®s ¿1 = 1;500
and ¿2 = 15;000 to de¯ne the cones. The estimation is run with Ireland excluded.
Table 4: Coe±cient estimates for the 2 £ 2 model.
29model.
In a related work, Xu (2003) focuses on 14 developing countries during the period 1982-1992
and runs Rybczynski regressions at the industry level. He also presents evidence that these
developing countries were belonging to di®erent cones during the period under consideration.
But he ¯nds that developing countries tend to specialize in labor-intensive goods when they
accumulate capital. This seems to contradict the textbook Rybczynski prediction. Contrary to
Xu (2003), we ¯nd that the Rybczynski e®ect explains changes in specialization, even for the
developing countries. Why such a di®erence? While Xu (2003) de¯nes the capital-intensity of
an industry as the average capital-intensity during the whole period and across all countries,
we rather follow Schott (2003) and rely on HO aggregates. This explicitly takes into account
the fact that there are substantial di®erences in capital intensity within industries and that
countries alter their intra-industry specialization as they accumulate capital. What we present
in this paper is therefore a test of the HO model that is both less restrictive and more in the
spirit of the textbook model. It is less restrictive because we are agnostic about the evolution
of industrial specialization if one de¯nes industries as in the ISIC. It is more in the spirit of the
HO model as goods are grouped according to their production technology.
One way to check whether our results make sense or not is to compute the annual compen-
sations implied by our estimates: for each country and at any point in time, the implied annual
compensation for an e®ective unit of labor is given by the intercept of the vertical axis and the
tangent to the total value-added curve. Data on compensation in the manufacturing sector are
collected by the International Labor Organization.25 Figure 14 presents these actual compensa-
tions in 1996 and the compensations implied by our model. The implied compensations appear
25See the International Labor Organization website, http://laborsta.ilo.org. Annual compensation data are
not always available for 1996. When this is not the case, we use other compensation data (monthly, weekly,
daily, hourly) or wage data. When used, wage data are multiplied by 1.5. The U.S. compensation data have
been multiplied by 1.2 as the available data are for production workers only. For Denmark, we used 1993
compensation data. When the 1996-2000 capital-labor ratio is not available for a country, we use the most
recent available number.





























































































Figure 8: Development paths for the two HO aggregates, actual and estimated (aggregate-time
dummies omitted).









n for the di®erent dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the
aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 U.S. dollars.




























































































Figure 9: Development paths for the two HO aggregates, actual and estimated (aggregate-time
dummies omitted), continued.









n for the di®erent dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the
aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 U.S. dollars.



























































































Figure 10: Development paths for the two HO aggregates, actual and estimated (aggregate-time
dummies omitted), continued.









n for the di®erent dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the
aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 U.S. dollars.






























































































Figure 11: Development paths for the two HO aggregates, actual and estimated (aggregate-time
dummies omitted), continued.









n for the di®erent dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the






























































































Figure 12: Development paths for the two HO aggregates, actual and estimated (aggregate-time
dummies omitted), continued.









n for the di®erent dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the
aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 U.S. dollars.















































Figure 13: Development paths for the two HO aggregates, actual and estimated (aggregate-time
dummies omitted), continued.









n for the di®erent dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the
aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 U.S. dollars.
to be of the right order of magnitude. For the United States and Japan, we have an almost per-
fect prediction. But for other countries, the implied compensation is signi¯cantly di®erent from
the actual one: for many South or Central American countries, we overestimate compensation,
while for the European countries, compensation is underestimated. We nevertheless ¯nd that
the overall results strengthen the case for the \HO aggregates" approach.
2.5 Robustness checks
Including Ireland changes the results in an anticipated way. In Ireland, value-added per worker
has increased dramatically and this rapid rise has not been matched by any corresponding
increase in the capital-labor ratio. In addition, Ireland is rather specialized in the capital-
intensive HO aggregate. As a result, when we include Ireland, ±t
k rises with t (from 0 for t = 1978
to 0.18 for t = 1998), as well as ±t
k=±t
l. This indicates that, everything else equal, countries should



































































Figure 14: Annual compensation per employee in 1996, actual and implied by the model (in
thousands of 1996 U.S. dollars).
alter their specialization towards the capital-intensive goods. Similarly, the cone cuto®s should
move over time, which contradicts our assumption of ¯xed cuto®s. Nevertheless, as Ireland
remains a medium-size economy, we consider the estimates without Ireland as our main results.
We have presented results with speci¯c cone cuto®s, ¿1 = 1;500 and ¿2 = 15;000, and a
corresponding HO aggregate cuto®, q = 3;000 (all numbers in 1996 U.S. dollars of quality-
equivalent capital per e®ective worker). With lower ¿c's and adjusting accordingly the HO
aggregate cuto®, q, the results are not much a®ected. For instance, we cannot reject that
±t
k = ±t
l over the whole period, 1976-2000. With ¿1 = 2;000, ¿2 = 15;000 and q = 4;000, we
cannot reject this hypothesis over the whole period (except for the period 1993-1997). With the
latter cuto®s, we still ¯nd very small positive change in the absolute pro¯tability of producing
the capital-intensive goods (little changes in ±t
k), while the results might indicate a decrease in
the relative price of labor-intensive goods.
We have also estimated a model without decreasing marginal product of capital in the
capital-rich cone. Most of the results do not change signi¯cantly. The major change occurs for
37the implied compensations. As expected, we ¯nd lower implied compensations for the countries
in the third cone, and the gap between the implied compensations and the actual ones gets
larger. The overall ¯t of the model (measured by the root MSE for the two aggregates) gets
also reduced. We take this as evidence in favor of a decreasing return to capital in the third
cone. An estimation of the model setting ¯ = 0:6 indicates a slightly higher increase in the
pro¯tability of producing the capital-intensive goods, but we still cannot reject that ±t
k = ±t
l
over the whole period.
3 The return to capital
3.1 The ¯nancial rate of return to capital
The HO model with more than one cone predicts that the return to capital is constant in the
diversi¯cation cone(s), decreasing with the capital-labor ratio in the specialization cones, and
decreasing from one cone to the next. In the present work, because the return to capital (or the
value of the MPK) is the slope of the total value-added per worker curve and because prices
are expressed in 1996 U.S. dollars, we can ¯nd an estimate of the return to capital in country
n in 1996-2000 implied by our model. It is given by:




n · ¿1 (14)























n is the average capital-labor ratio in country n during the period 1996-2000. Note that
these are the returns to a unit of quality-equivalent capital in the various countries. Imposing
the structure of our empirical model should allow to get rid of some biases introduced by
measurement errors or medium-run °uctuations. Table 6 (¯rst column) shows the resulting
38estimates for the return to capital in the various countries.26 Figure 15 makes clear that, as
predicted by the HO model with multiple cones, the value of b r is decreasing with K¤
L¤ . The
correlation between the capital-labor ratio and b r is -0.24.27
As presented in Caselli and Feyrer (2007), in a world of capital mobility in which ¯rms and
households have access to investment opportunities that yield a common world interest rate
R¤, what should be equalized is the ¯nancial return of investing in the manufacturing sector
in the various countries. So, for each country n, we should have an equality between the gross
rate of return (of investing in the country's manufacturing sector) and a common gross rate of
return R¤:




where d is the depreciation rate. Assuming that the price of capital goods remains constant over




¡ d = R
¤ ¡ 1;8n:
In this world, it is the return to capital (or the value of the MPK) corrected by the real price
of capital goods that should be similar across countries. Table 6 (second column) reports our
estimates of the ¯nancial rates of return to capital for the year 1996. These are generally much
lower and less dispersed than the original rn's. Figure 15 plots \ FRRKn = b rn
Pkn ¡d as a function
of K¤
n=L¤
n. It clearly shows that the returns to capital are indeed made much more equal by this
real price adjustment. On average, a higher K¤
L¤ does not imply a lower ¯nancial rate of return
to capital. The correlation between the capital-labor ratio and \ FRRK is almost equal to 0,
at 0.06.28 This evidence can be taken as part of an explanation for the Lucas (1990) paradox.
26As Sri Lanka had an average capita-labor ratio just below the cone cuto® ¿1 during the period 1996-2000,
we use Equation 15 to compute its return to capital.
27In a linear regression of r on K¤=L¤, the coe±cient on K¤=L¤ is negative, but not statistically di®erent
from zero at conventional levels, perhaps due to our small sample size. Although Bangladesh appears to be a
country with a very high return to capital, our results do not change much when excluding this country from
our sample.
28In a linear regression of FRRK on K¤=L¤, the coe±cient on K¤=L¤ is positive, but not statistically





































Sri Lanka 0.27 0.06
Sweden 0.44 0.35
Trinidad Tobago 0.25 0.08
Turkey 1.08 0.33
United Kingdom 0.39 0.33




Std. Dev. 0.70 0.23
Table 5: Estimated returns to capital (^ rn) and ¯nancial rates of return to capital ( \ FRRKn)
for the period 1996-2000.













Figure 15: Estimated returns to capital (^ rn) and ¯nancial rates of return to capital ( \ FRRKn).
Notes: The computations are explained in the text. The capital-labor ratios are in thousands of 1996 U.S.
dollars of capital per quality-equivalent worker.
Indeed, there does not seem to be much to be gained from a systematic reallocation of capital
from rich to poor countries.
These ¯ndings bear some similarity with those of Caselli and Feyrer (2007). With a di®erent
estimation method, they also ¯nd that the physical MPK is much higher on average in poor
countries. Relying on data from the PWT, they argue that this is compensated by a relatively
high cost of investment goods in these countries. Contrary to our reasoning, they argue that
this high relative cost of capital goods in poor countries is due to a low price of consumption
goods in those countries, while capital goods sell at roughly the same price in all countries. As
noticed by Caselli and Feyrer, this may be a consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis
(the productivity gap between poor and rich countries is larger for tradables (including capital
goods) than for non-tradables (including consumption goods)).29
In this paper, we also ¯nd that the returns to capital tend to be higher in poor countries and
di®erent from zero. When we exclude Bangladesh, the same coe±cient is still positive and becomes statistically
signi¯cant.
29Hsieh and Klenow (2007) provide empirical evidence for this hypothesis.
41that these di®erences are compensated by a high relative cost of capital goods in poor countries.
But, on the last point, our reasoning is the opposite of the one by Caselli and Feyrer (2007). As
we focus on the manufacturing sector, the produced goods are generally tradable and therefore
the law of one price should be approximately valid for these goods. On the contrary, we use
the results in Eaton-Kortum (2001) who ¯nd that a unit of quality-equivalent capital is more
expensive in poor countries. We thus ¯nd in poor countries a high relative price of capital
goods, but this is due to their high absolute prices.
3.2 The return to capital and structural change
Neoclassical growth theory does not predict that, in autarky, capital accumulation should fun-
damentally alter the structure of the economy. An increase in the capital-labor ratio leads to a
reduction in the relative cost of capital and industries substitute capital for labor accordingly.
With more capital-intensive techniques, the marginal product of capital goes down and growth
rates of autarky economies are bound to converge.
Ventura (1997) proposes a mechanism through which international trade favors capital accu-
mulation, structural change and growth. A small open economy that accumulates capital moves
its resources away from the labor-intensive industries to the capital-intensive industries. This is
the Rybczynski e®ect. Note that this is possible as long as the country is not fully specialized
in the capital-intensive goods. But this structural transformation raises the demand for capital
and helps to sustain the marginal product of capital. As long as the world capital-labor ratio
does not change, the relative price of the capital-intensive goods and the value of the marginal
product of capital remain stable. By trading with the rest of the world, the growing economy
\beats the curse of diminishing returns". Ventura (1997) argues that this phenomenon is part
of the explanation for the economic \miracle" in East Asia.
Our results support this analysis, but they allow us to be more precise about the actual
process. In his model, Ventura (1997) assumes that all countries are in the same cone, neces-
42sarily a cone of diversi¯cation. On the one hand, we have found instead that most countries
move within or across two cones. On the other hand, we show two things that might generate
what Ventura exposes.
First, we ¯nd almost by construction that, during the ¯rst phase of their miracle, the East
Asian countries remained in the cone of diversi¯cation. If Ventura's (1997) reasoning can be
transposed to our world with not two goods but with two HO aggregates, the MPK must have
been constant over time for the East Asian countries, at least in the ¯rst phase of their miracle.
Second, our results indicate that the return to capital has not decreased over time at any
given capital-labor ratio. This happened even though most countries accumulated capital, and
not only the (initially) small East Asian economies. To explain this result, we can mention that
labor-rich countries have started trading with the rest of the world, thus stabilizing the world
capital-labor ratio. It might also be that returns to capital have been sustained by technological
progress in the capital-intensive industries. Finally, the result may be due to a non-homothetic
demand. The important result is that some economic mechanisms have sustained the value of
the MPK.
In addition, the data tell us that changes in intra-industry specialization have also been
signi¯cant during the period 1976-2000. This possibility to alter one's specialization within an
industry should facilitate the process of factor reallocation. Intuitively, it should be easier for
¯rms to alter their specialization from, say, rudimentary machinery to higher quality machinery
(a change in intra-industry specialization) than from coarse textiles to high quality machinery
(a change of specialization across industries).30 What are the respective contributions of intra-
industry specialization and between-industry specialization to the change in K=L? This can
be found using the decomposition that follows. A country's capital-labor ratio at date t is just
the weighted sum of the capital-labor ratios in the various industries, the weight of industry i
30With data on the U.S. manufacturing sector, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) show that changes in
specialization within the same industry can also be a response to competition from exporters located in low-
wage countries.




























. The change in a country capital-labor ratio can then be decomposed as






































































2 . A positive within-industry change indicates
that, on average, industries have become more capital-intensive: this shows how changes in
intra-industry specialization and factor substitution can explain a change in a country's capital-
labor ratio. A positive between-industry change indicates that, on average, the labor share of
the capital-intensive industries has gone up.
Table 6 presents the results of this decomposition for the periods (1976-1980)-(1986-1990)
and (1986-1990)-(1996-2000). The result is striking: for most countries, the within-industry
change is by far the most important. This is due to two factors: the standard factor substi-
tution, but also the changes in intra-industry specialization emphasized in Schott (2003) and
here. While we do ¯nd in the data that, in Korea for instance, labor has massively moved out
of the labor-intensive textile industry, this kind of reallocation of labor across sectors remains
an exception. In addition, this movement of labor out of the textile industry does not explain
much of the increase in the Korean capital-labor ratio in manufacturing because, when com-
pared to the Korean average capital-labor ratio, this sector is not extremely labor-intensive.
Moreover, as Xu (2003), we ¯nd that some capital-accumulating countries (Singapore for in-
stance) increase their production in the industrial sectors that are on average labor-intensive
(negative contribution of the between e®ect). Table 6 also indicates that a minority of countries






Country (1976-1980)-(1986-1990) Between Within (1986-1990)-(1996-2000) Between Within
Australia 2,270 -27% 127% na na na
Austria 6,846 -1% 101% 8,054 -48% 148%
Bolivia 3,589 -26% 126% -3,070 -18% 118%
Canada 6,336 -12% 112% na na na
Chile -1,712 37% 63% 4,965 1% 99%
Cyprus -8,254 7% 93% -2,565 -93% 193%
Denmark -7,292 29% 71% na na na
Finland 6,130 3% 97% 6,186 -27% 127%
Greece 1,497 -10% 110% 2,757 43% 57%
Hong-Kong 525 25% 75% 22,372 -9% 109%
Indonesia 11 -560% 660% 4,012 -9% 109%
Israel na na na 5,637 -4% 104%
Italy 7,757 -56% 156% -5,378 141% -41%
Japan 5,014 -68% 168% 21,161 -3% 103%
Korea 5,929 -8% 108% 34,378 5% 95%
Malaysia 2,215 -5% 105% 5,864 0% 100%
Mexico na na na 3,978 -27% 127%
Netherlands 10,567 25% 75% 7,473 -13% 113%
Norway 6,041 -6% 106% -966 231% -131%
Portugal -2,073 56% 44% -1,449 196% -96%
Singapore 9,298 -9% 109% 13,038 -4% 104%
Spain na na na -2,196 98% 2%
Sweden 7,841 -6% 106% na na na
United Kingdom 9,829 -6% 106% 10,933 -14% 114%
USA 7,273 -7% 107% 8,204 -1% 101%
Note: Capital and labor are measured in quality-equivalent units. Capital is in 1996 U.S. dollars. The
decomposition is described in Equation 17 and explained in the text. na = not available.
Table 6: A decomposition of the changes in the capital-labor ratios.
between industries. Overall, the structural change emphasized by Ventura (1997) should be
facilitated by the fact that it occurs mainly within industries rather than between industries.
4 Conclusion
Using panel data, we estimate a simple Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model with multiple cones,
intra-industry specialization, and TFP di®erences across countries. In addition, to make factor
quantities comparable across countries, we measure factors in quality-equivalent units. With
the time dimension, we can improve on Schott (2003) who focused on a single cross section: the
45country time series allow us to estimate TFP di®erences and to compare the actual development
paths to the ones predicted by theory.
More fundamentally, with our integrated approach, we emphasize not only the relationship
between factor endowments and specialization, but also the role played by factor returns. In-
deed, with the estimated parameters, we can obtain both the compensations for e®ective units
of labor and the rental rates for e®ective units of capital implied by the model. We then use
these estimates to test for the internal consistency of the approach (there is no FPE) and to
study the incentives to re-allocate or accumulate capital.
In the various cross sections, we ¯nd that poor countries have higher rental rates of capital
and, accordingly, specialize in the production of labor-intensive goods. Although one could
expect these higher returns to attract investment from rich countries, we show that the ¯nancial
rates of return to capital investment are generally not higher in the less developed countries.
The reason for this is that, as Eaton and Kortum (2001) have shown, the price of e®ective capital
is higher in poor countries. This could explain why we do not observe larger investments from
rich into poor countries.
Analyzing the development paths, we ¯nd that countries experience the structural change
predicted by theory. Moreover, decomposing the changes over time in the countries' capital-
labor ratios in within-industry changes and between-industry changes, we show that, for most
countries (including the East Asian growth miracles), this process of structural change is mainly
a change of specialization within industries. Therefore, structural transformation has been
less disruptive than it would have been with the more radical changes of specialization across
industries. In addition, despite capital accumulation by most countries, we ¯nd no decrease in
the return to capital (or in the value of the MPK) at any given capital-labor ratio. This must
have stimulated growth through capital accumulation.
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